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INTRODUCTION
The Post Conviction Relief Act provides a procedure for defendants to collater-
ally challenge their conviction or sentence. The Act is the sole means2 of obtaining
collateral relief and has been broadly interpreted as creating a unified statutory
framework for reviewing claims that were traditionally cognizable in habeas cor-
pus.3 The Act permits defendants in custody4 to seek relief when the conviction or
sentence results from one or more of the Act's specifically enumerated errors or de-
fects5 and when the claimed error has not been waived6 or previously litigated7 on
appeal or in a previous petition under the Act. Subject to several narrow exceptions,
a petition under the Act must be filed within one year of the date the defendants's
judgment becomes final.8 This article reports on a number of recent decisions of the
Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior Court construing provisions of the Act.
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University and the author
of the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Act-Practice & Procedure (2010 ed.).
1. 42 Pa.C.S. §9541 et seq.
2. 42 Pa.C.S. §9542.
3. Commonwealth v. Ahlborn, 699 A.2d 718, 721 (Pa. 1997); Commonwealth v. Chester, 733 A.2d 1242, 1250-
1251 (Pa. 1999).
4. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(a)(1).
5. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543(aO(2).
6. 42 Pa.C.S. §9543 (a)(4), 9544(b).
7. 42 Pa.C.S. §9544(a).
8. 42 Pa.C.S. §9545(b).
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ASSESSING CREDIBILITY OF UNCALLED AND INADEQUATELY
PREPARED WITNESSES
In Commonwealth v. Johnson,9 the Supreme Court addressed the PCRA court's
obligation to assess credibility when the defendant alleges trial counsel was inef-
fective in failing to interview and call potential eyewitnesses identified in discovery
materials and to interview and adequately prepare alibi witnesses. At trial, counsel
presented an alibi defense for a different day of the week than the day the crime
occurred. The PCRA court concluded that trial counsel's presentation of inconsis-
tent alibi testimony constituted per se ineffectiveness. Without assessing their cred-
ibility, the PCRA court also found counsel ineffectivelo for failing to interview and
present the witnesses who had relevant and potentially exculpatory evidence.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the PCRA's
courts finding of per se ineffectiveness. Per se prejudice,
the Court noted, has been confined to cases where A PCRA court
counsel's act or omission constitutes a complete failure must assess the
to serve as the client's advocate." The Court held that
inconsistent alibi evidence does not constitute a com- credibility of
plete failure of counsel nor is it sufficiently analogous uncailed witnesses
to cases where the presumption of prejudice has been
applied. As a result, actual and not per se prejudice m order to deter-
governs claims involving counsel's presentation of incon- mine prejudice
sistent alibi testimony.
The Court also disagreed with the PCRA court's con- under Stickland.
clusion that credibility findings were unnecessary
where the uncalled witnesses had relevant and potentially exculpatory evidence.
The Court held that a PCRA court cannot make the required finding of prejudice
under the Strickland standard when it fails to assess the credibility of uncalled
witnesses. Noting that no prior state or federal decision had set out a standard for
credibility determinations in the Strickland prejudice context, the Court looked to its
after-discovered evidence cases based upon recantation testimony and held that
upon remand, the PCRA court was to determine whether the"the nature and qual-
ity of the evidence is such that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would
have credited it and rendered a more favorable verdict."'12 The Court noted that the
assessment by the PCRA court must include the demeanor and potential impeach-
ability of the witnesses.
9. 966 A.2d 523 (Pa. 2009).
10. In responding to the PCRA court's finding that counsel's omissions individually might not consti-
tute ineffectiveness "but taken as a whole" lead the court to the conclusion that counsel was ineffective
in the guilt phase of the trial, the Supreme Court noted that while "no number of failed [ineffectiveness]
claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually", where there are multiple
instances of"deficient performance, the assessment of prejudice properly may be premised upon cumu-
lation."Id. at 532.
11. In Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216 (Pa. 2009), the Court held that actual and not presumed
prejudice governed when the defendant alleges appellate counsel was ineffective in filing a defective
appellate brief that narrowed review by the appellate court. The Court stated that the filing of an appel-
late brief that is deficient in some manner does not constitute a complete failure to act as defendant's
advocate so as to warrant presuming prejudice. See also Commonwealth v. Pulcano, 954 A.2d 639 (Pa. Super.
2008) (where defendant claims appellate counsel was ineffective in not raising all appealable
issues, defendant must establish that the claims not pursued have arguable merit, appellate counsel had
no reasonable basis to present the claims, and had the claims been pursued, there is a reasonable prob-
ability that the result of direct appeal would have been different).
12. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d at 542.
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POST-TRIAL MOTIONS AND INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS
In 2002, in Commonwealth v. Grant1 3, the Supreme Court abandoned is long-stand-
ing rule that claims of ineffectiveness had to be raised by new counsel at the first
opportunity, even if that first opportunity was direct appeal and the issue had not
been presented to the trial court. Under Grant, claims of ineffectiveness are no
longer considered on direct appeal but deferred to the post-conviction process. In
Commonwealth v. Bomar,14 the Supreme Court held that Grant did not apply when
defendant's claims of ineffectiveness were raised by new counsel in a post-trial
motion and the trial court heard testimony of trial counsel and addressed the inef-
fectiveness claims in its opinion.
In several post-Bomar cases, Chief Justice Castille stated his view that ineffective-
ness claims should not be entertained on post-trial motions because such a practice
raised questions of delay, abuse and arbitrariness.' 5 The use of post-trial motions to
raise ineffectiveness claims was addressed recently by the Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Liston.16 In Liston, the defendant claimed counsel had failed to
protect his right to direct appeal. In addition, the defendant raised claims of inef-
fectiveness during the trial. The PCRA court granted the defendant the right to
appeal nunc pro tunc and took testimony on Liston's remaining claims of trial coun-
sel ineffectiveness but did not make rulings with respect to those claims. On appeal,
the Superior Court declined to address the defendant's ineffectiveness claims rely-
ing upon Grant. But based upon Bomar, the Superior Court held that whenever a
PCRA court reinstates a defendant's right to direct appeal, the PCRA court shall also
reinstate the defendant's right to file post-trial motions nunc pro tunc thereby allow-
ing the defendant to raise any issue of trial counsel ineffectiveness.' 7 The court
noted that this procedure would permit the court, consistent with Bomar to review
the defendant's ineffectiveness claims on the ensuing direct appeal thereby saving
judicial time and the need for the defendant to file a second PCRA raising the same
claims later in the process.' 8
In reversing Liston, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court had
"overstepped its authority" by creating an exception to Grant and had, in effect,
created a new rule of criminal procedure. The problem, the Court stated, was that the
13. 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002).
14. 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
15. Commonwealth v. O'Berg, 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Rega, 033 A.2d 997 (Pa. 2007).
16. 977 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2009).
17. Liston relied on the Superior Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Miranda, 442 A.2d 1133 (Pa.
Super. 1982). In Miranda, the court addressed the role of the post-conviction court when the defendant
alleges ineffectiveness of both trial counsel and the failure of appellate counsel to protect the defendant's
right to direct appeal. The court held that where the post-conviction court grants the defendant the right
to appeal nunc pro tunc, the post-conviction court is required to complete the record with respect to other
claims of ineffectiveness in order for those claims to the be reviewed in the nunc pro tunc direct appeal.
Liston noted that Miranda was decided when claims of ineffectiveness were deemed waived unless raised
by new counsel at the first opportunity. Even though Grant changed this rule, Liston concluded that the
concerns in Miranda with respect to judicial economy and efficiency remained valid notwithstanding
Grant.
18. At issue in Liston was whether the approach to the problem of resolving a post-conviction petition
that raised claims of both ineffectiveness during trial and failure to protect the defendant's right to direct
appeal adopted by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Miranda, 442 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 1982) re-
mained workable in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Grant. In Miranda, the court held that when
a defendant raises multiple issues of ineffectiveness including counsel's failure to protect defendant's
right to direct appeal, if the PCRA court grants the right to direct appeal, it is required to complete the
record with respect to the other claims of ineffectiveness in order for those issues to be reviewed in the
nunc pro tunc direct appeal.
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Superior Court established a procedure for some defendant's to obtain an addi-
tional opportunity to challenge their conviction based upon ineffectiveness of coun-
sel before direct appeal had occurred. The Court held that a defendant who has
been given the right to direct appeal nunc pro tunc has the right to seek PCRA review
after direct appeal is concluded.19
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Castille warned lower courts not to take
affirmative steps to accommodate unitary review under the Bomar exception to
Grant. The Chief Justice noted that Bomar was never intended to create a right to uni-
tary review. Trial judges should not permit such review unless accompanied by an
express, knowing and voluntary waiver of PCRA review which would permit
"acceleration of collateral review" but would not "arbitrarily afford certain defen-
dants both accelerated and multiple rounds of collateral review."20 The Chief Justice
recommended that the matter be sent to the Criminal Rules Committee to deter-
mine under what circumstances unitary review should be permitted on post-trial
motions.21
SHORT SENTENCES AND REVIEW OF INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIMS
In Commonwealth v. Moore,22 a pre-Liston case, the Superior Court returned to
the problem of Grant and the review of ineffectiveness claims in cases where the
defendant receives a short sentence that will be served during the pendency of
direct appeal, or where there is no appeal, the sentence will be served before the
post-conviction process is completed.23 Following Grant, the Superior Court had
recognized a "short sentence" exception to the Grant rule that permitted appellate
review of claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness on the grounds that a defendant's
short sentence would preclude collateral review of the claims.24 In Commonwealth v.
O'Berg,25 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the "short sentence" exception
19. The Supreme Court noted that its decision did not prohibit a PCRA court from reinstating a
defendant's right to file post-trial motions nunc pro tunc if it was established that counsel was ineffective
in failing to file the motions. What the Supreme Court prohibited in Liston was affording a defendant ac-
cess to post-trial motions to raise ineffectiveness claims where there was no claim that counsel had failed
to protect the defendant's right to file such motions.
20. 977 A.2d at 1096. See also Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1032 (Pa. 2007) (Castille, C.J. concur-
ring) ([PIrolix ineffectiveness claims should not be entertained as of right on post-verdict or post-
sentencing motions-unless, perhaps, the defendant expressly enters a record waiver of his of-right, first
PCRA petition. Allowing pre-PCRA hybrid review raises questions of avoidable delay, abuse, arbitrari-
ness, and avoidable complication").
21. In Commonwealth v. Fransen, 986 A.2d 154 (Pa. Super. 2009), a post-Liston case, the Superior Court
held that the PCRA court did not err when it granted direct appeal nunc pro tunc where counsel failed to
file a Pa.R.App.P. 1925 (b) but did not hold an evidentiary hearing on other claims of trial counsel inef-
fectiveness.The court stated that Liston specifically prohibited the Superior Court from expanding Bomar
and directed the defendant to file another PCRA petition following disposition of his direct appeal.
22. 978 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. 2009).
23. To obtain PCRA relief, the defendant must be in custody at the time relief is granted. 42 Pa. Cons.
Stat. Ann. §9543(a)(1).
24. See Commonwealth v. Salisbury, 823 A.2d 914, 916 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003) ("review delayed constitutes
review denied."); Commonwealth v. Ingold, 823 A.2d 917 (Pa. Super. 2003); Commonwealth v. Viglione, 842
A.2d 454 (Pa. Super. 2004).
25. 880 A.2d 597 (Pa. 2005). After the Superior Court dismissed O'Berg's ineffectiveness claims without
prejudice to O'Berg raising his claims in a PCRA proceeding, O'Berg sought review in the Supreme
Court seeking an exception to Grant when PCRA review is not available because the defendant is no
longer in custody. O'Berg argued that Grant placed him in the unfair position of losing his opportunity
to litigate his ineffectiveness claim and that such a result conflicted with the intent of Grant, which was
to offer "a petitioner the best avenue to effect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel." Grant, 813 A.2d at
738.
114 PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION QUARTERLY I July 2010
to Grant finding that the exception would undermine the rationale of the general rule
announced in Grant to defer ineffectiveness claims to the post-conviction process.26
In Moore, the Superior Court held that when a defendant raises an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim on a post-sentence motion after being found in con-
tempt of a Protection from Abuse Order and sentenced to a short period of impris-
onment, judicial economy and fairness is best served by the trial court conducting a
post-sentence Bomar27 evidentiary hearing. The court noted that given the maxi-
mum sentence that may be imposed for violating a Protection from Abuse Order,
PCRA relief may not be a "practical or timely vehicle" 28 to review the defendant's
ineffectiveness claim. On the other hand, a Bomar evidentiary hearing will permit
the claims to be reviewed on direct appeal.29
FORCIBLY MEDICATING PETITIONERS UNABLE TO CHOOSE
WHETHER TO CONTINUE TO PURSUE PCRA RELIEF
In two capital cases, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether a de-
fendant who had sought PCRA relief but is presently incompetent may be com-
pelled to take psychiatric medication for the purpose of rendering him competent
to determine whether to pursue PCRA relief.30 In Commonwealth v. Sam31 and
Commonwealth v. Watson,32 the PCRA court found the defendants were unable because
of incompetency to participate in PCRA proceedings. In both cases, the Common-
wealth sought an order to require the defendants to take psychiatric medication. In
response, the PCRA court heard testimony as to whether the defendant would
respond to medication and possible side effects of the medication. In Sam, the PCRA
court denied the Commonwealth's motion finding that Sam was not a danger to
himself or others. The court also concluded that the Commonwealth had not met
the Sell v. United States33 conditions governing involuntary administration of anti-
26. In a concurring opinion, then Justice Castille rejected the Commonwealth's argument that a"short
sentence" exception was not necessary because the Bomar exception to Grant allows defendants with
short sentences to obtain review of ineffectiveness claims by means of a post-trial motion. Justice Castille
noted that ineffectiveness claims were"quintessentially collateral claims" expressly cognizable under the
PCRA and that the Court should not"subvert the PCRA"by allowing for"pre-litigation"of ineffectiveness
claims by post-trial motions in cases where the defendant cannot pursue PCRA relief because they are
not in custody. O'Berg, 880 A.2d at 604 (Castille, J., concurring).
27. 826 A.2d 831 (Pa. 2003).
28. 978 A.2d at 992.
29. The trial court had denied the defendant an extension of time to file a post-sentence motion on
grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to extend the time period to file such a motion. In a concurring and
dissenting opinion, Judge Bowes agreed that the case should be remanded to the trial court to permit the
defendant to file a post-sentence motion as the trial court had authority to extend the time to file the
motion but dissented from the court's ruling directing the trial court to hold a Bomar hearing on the
grounds that the court's decision may be seen as "another effort by this Court to carve out its own
exception" to Grant. Moore, 978 A.2d at 995 (Bowes, J., concurring and dissenting).
30. In Commonwealth v. Zook, 887 A.2d 1218, 1224-25 (Pa. 2005), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
defined competence in the post-conviction context as the ability to "understand[ the process and goals
of PCRA proceedings and ... to assist in that process to the extent required given the specific legal and
factual issues which remain to be litigated."
31. 952 A.2d 565 (Pa. 2008).
32. 952 A.2d 541 (Pa. 2008).
33. 539 U.S.166,179-80 (2003). In Sell, the Court spelled out four conditions that apply when determin-
ing whether antipsychotic medication can be administered involuntarily to render a defendant competent
for trial on "serious" criminal charges. Before ordering involuntary medication, a court must conclude that:
(1)"important governmental interests are at stake;"(2)"involuntary medication will substantially further"
those interests in that the administration of drugs is "substantially likely" to render the defendant com-
petent and"substantially unlikely" to have side effects that would interfere with the defendant's ability
to assist counsel; (3) that involuntary mediation is necessary and "any alternative, less intrusive treat-
ments are unlikely to achieve" the same results; and (4) the administration of the drugs is "medically
appropriate."
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psychotic drugs. In Watson, the PCRA court also denied the Commonwealth's
motion finding that Watson was not a danger to himself or others and that the pro-
posed medication would not result in the defendant being sufficiently competent to
proceed with his PCRA petition. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded in
both cases.
In both cases, the Court initially noted that the Commonwealth was not obligated
to meet the Sell conditions where involuntary medication is sought in the context of
a pending PCRA petition. The Court explained that in Sell forced medication was
sought to render the defendant competent to stand trial, an outcome the defendant
or counsel was seeking to avoid. In contrast to Sell, the Court found that in Sam and
Watson, forced medication was sought to permit each defendant to pursue post-con-
viction relief, a procedure to vindicate defendant's right to a fair trial. The Court
stated that an "inmate who is entitled to relief should not be arbitrarily denied the
prospect of collateral review."34 Even though the Court concluded the Sell condi-
tions are not constitutionally required in the post-conviction context, because the
parties and lower court relied upon the conditions, the Court reviewed the PCRA's
courts denial of the Commonwealth's motion to forcibly medicate the defendants
under the Sell framework.
The Court held in Sam and Watson that the Commonwealth's interest in finality
and the defendant's right to collateral review were "important governmental" inter-
ests. Based upon the medical evidence in each case, the Court found that the
Commonwealth had satisfied the remaining Sell conditions. As a result, the Court
held that the PCRA court in each case erred when it determined that compelling
medication violated the defendant's right to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally, the Court concluded that
involuntary medication to render the defendants competent did not violate the Penn-
sylvania Mental Health Procedures Act 35 or constitute a violation of defendants' pri-
vacy under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.36
INEFFECTIVENESS AND CAPITAL SENTENCING
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the issue of counsel's obligation
to investigate and present evidence of mitigation at capital sentencing in Strickland
v. Washington.37 In Strickland, the Court established a two-part performance and
prejudice standard3 8 that governs claims of ineffectiveness of counsel. With respect
34. Commonwealth v. Watson, 952 A.2d at 555.
35. 50 P.S. §7101-7503. The Court held that the MPHA which provides a standard for incompetence to
"proceed on criminal charges"does not apply to a convicted defendant's competence to pursue collateral
relief.
36. After conducting an analysis under Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991), the Court
concluded that the right of"people to be secure in their persons" protected by Article I., Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution did not include an"inmate's right refuse medication absent clear and present
danger." Commonwealth v. Sam, 952 A.2d at 588.
37. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
38. "First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defen-
dant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that deficient performance prejudiced
the defense.This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant a fair
trial, a trial whose result is unreliable." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 693. Although the test for
determining ineffectiveness is the same under both the Pennsylvania and United Sates Constitution,
Pennsylvania courts use a three-prong standard that requires the defendant to demonstrate that (1) the
issue underlying the claim of ineffectiveness has arguable merit, (2) counsel did not have a reasonable
basis for the act or omission in question, and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Pierce, 527
A.2d 973 (Pa.1987).
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to counsel's duty to investigate evidence of mitigation, the Court in Strickland stated
that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."39 Where counsel decides
as a tactical matter not to investigate or to limit the scope of investigation into
potential mitigating evidence, the decision will be "directly assessed for reason-
ableness in all the circumstances.. . ."40
In recent cases applying Strickland, the United States Supreme Court has found
counsel ineffective at capital sentencing. In Williams v. Taylor,41 the Court concluded
that counsels' failure to discover and present mitigating evidence at sentencing
could not be justified as a tactical decision because counsel had not "fulfilled their
obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background."42 In
Wiggins v. Smith,43 the Court concluded that counsels' decision not to expand their
investigation beyond the PSI and the defendant's social service records was not rea-
sonable in light of evidence in the social service records-"evidence that would
have lead a reasonably competent attorney to investigate further."" And in Rompilla
v. Beard,45 the Court concluded that counsel's investigation fell below the Strickland
standard because (1) counsel failed to examine the court file on defendant's prior
conviction which counsel knew the prosecution would rely on in establishing de-
fendant's history of violence; and (2) the prior conviction file contained a "range of
mitigation leads" 46 including prison files which described the defendant's "child-
hood and mental health very differently from anything defense counsel had seen or
heard" 47 from other sources.
The issue of counsels' performance at the sentencing hearing was considered by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a number of recent decisions. In Commonwealth
v. Ligons,4 the PCRA court granted the defendant a new sentencing hearing after
finding that trial counsel had not provided the defendant's medical and school
records to the psychologist who had been retained for the sentencing hearing and
had not investigated defendant's juvenile convictions. In reversing the PCRA's
court, the Supreme Court noted that whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to develop and present sufficient mitigating evidence depended upon a number of
factors including the "reasonableness of counsel's investigation, the mitigation evi-
dence that was actually presented and the mitigation evidence that could have been
presented." 49 The Court held that Ligons was not entitled to a new sentencing hear-
39. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 695. In Strickland, the defendant claimed counsel was ineffec-
tive in failing to request a psychiatric examination and to present evidence of the defendant's character
and emotional state. The Court disagreed finding counsel's decision not to seek additional character or
psychological evidence reasonable as"counsel could reasonably surmise from his conversations with re-
spondent that character and psychological evidence would be of little help"and that restricting testimony
to what had already been presented at the plea colloquy ensured that "contrary character and psycho-
logical evidence"would not come in at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 701. See also Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S.
776 (1987) (while noting that counsel could have made a more thorough investigation, counsel not inef-
fective for failure to discover and introduce evidence concerning the defendant's unstable childhood as
decision to not investigate further based upon reasonable professional judgment that such evidence may
have harmed the defendant as much as it might have helped him).
40. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
41. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
42. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 396.
43. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
44. Id. at 534.
45. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
46. Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. at 390.
47. Id.
48. 971 A.2d 1125 (Pa. 2009).
49. Id. at 1149.
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ing because he failed to establish that he had been prejudiced by counsel's perfor-
mance. The Court found that the evidence presented during the sentencing hearing
was not materially different from the evidence that trial counsel allegedly did not
investigate and provide to the mental health expert. As a result, the Court con-
cluded that it was not convinced that had the evidence that was overlooked been
presented to the jury, the result of the sentencing hearing would have been different.
The Court found that Rompilla was not controlling because the evidence overlooked
by counsel was not intended to put into question evidence the Commonwealth pre-
sented nor would it have lead to the discovery of new mitigation evidence. The
Court also distinguished Williams and Wiggins as cases where the mitigating evi-
dence not presented to the jury significantly differed from the evidence presented
at the sentencing hearing. Finally, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that
PCRA counsel was ineffective5 o in failing to present to the PCRA court mitigation
evidence that was available in support of his claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness.
The Court concluded that the defendant had failed to establish that PCRA counsel
lacked a reasonable basis for the mitigation evidence submitted to the PCRA court
rather than submitting "different, but not more extensive mitigation evidence" 5 '
offered in defendant's Supreme Court brief.
In Commonwealth v. Sattazahn,52 the Supreme Court affirmed the PCRA court's
determination that trial counsel had failed to conduct an adequate investigation for
mitigating evidence. The Court found that counsel should have reviewed a file from
a prior murder case including a Department of Corrections report which contained
"red flags" of brain damage and other potential mental health issues. In addition,
counsel failed to investigate and develop evidence of the defendant's poor school
performance suggesting cognitive, emotional and social difficulties and to obtain a
mental health evaluation of the defendant. The Court found that "no reasonable
strategy" 53 justified counsel's limited investigation and that the presentation at trial
of the mitigation evidence put forward at the post-conviction would have provided
support for a number of statutory mitigators. As a result, the Court concluded that
the defendant was prejudiced by counsel's limited case for mitigation because the
absence of relevant mitigating evidence diminished confidence in the outcome of
the sentencing hearing.
In Commonwealth v. Ly, 54 trial counsel's case for mitigation consisted solely of
testimony that focused on the defendant's three year old son. Counsel testified at
the PCRA hearing that he met only twice with the defendant prior to trial and did
not otherwise communicate with him in writing or by phone. He also acknowledged
that he did not investigate the defendant's background prior to trial and was of the
view that the jury would not favorably consider evidence of the defendant's back-
ground. In contrast to the evidence presented by trial counsel at the sentencing
hearing, the PCRA court heard testimony concerning the defendant's life history
50. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a defendant in a capital case may raise the inef-
fectiveness of PCRA counsel on appeal to the Supreme Court because the appeal is the only opportunity
available to the defendant to do so. Commonwealth v. Hall, 872 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v.
Purcell. 724 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1999). The ineffectiveness claim must be raised in the original brief. Common-
wealth v. Base more, 744 A.2d 717, 726-727 (Pa. 2000) (holding reply brief is not the appropriate means of
presenting a claim of ineffectiveness of PCRA counsel). For the view that a claim of PCRA counsel inef-
fectiveness is a new claim and can only be raised in a serial PCRA petition, see Chief Justice Castille's con-
curring opinion in Ligons, 971 A.2d at 1163.
51. Id. at 1155.
52. 952 A.2d 640 (Pa. 2008).
53. Id. at 676.
54. 980 A.2d 61 (Pa.2009).
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including his life as a child in Saigon during the Vietnam War. Testimony also
included information about abuse by his father, the extreme conditions he experienced
in Vietnam and during his escape to the United States. Evidence was also presented
regarding the positive role the defendant played in assisting his siblings escape
Vietnam and settle in the United States. The PCRA court denied relief finding that
counsel had pursued a reasonable strategy at trial. In affirming the denial of PCRA
relief, the Supreme Court noted the potential merits of the claim that trial counsel
failed to conduct a mitigation investigation. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that
the issue was waived5 because PCRA counsel had failed to properly layer 56 the in-
effectiveness of counsel claim. Specifically, counsel did not assert direct appeal
counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to present trial counsel's failure to conduct an
investigation of mitigation evidence. The Court rejected PCRA counsel's argument
that because the claim was not record based, appellate counsel was not ineffective
in failing the present the issue on direct appeal.57 The Court also rejected PCRA
counsel's effort to assert his own ineffectiveness in failing to properly layer the
ineffectiveness claim. The Court held that a reply brief was not an appropriate
means to present an issue not previously raised.58
In Commonwealth v. Cox,59 the defendant claimed trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to investigate and develop mitigating evidence of traumatic childhood and
mental health problems. At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel acknowledged that she
did not investigate what effects childhood abuse and neglect may have had on the
defendant nor did she obtain school records or request the assistance of an investi-
gator or social worker to look into the defendant's background. Nor did counsel retain
a mental health expert notwithstanding indications in the pre-sentence reports that
the defendant might have underlying mental health problems including neurolog-
ical dysfunction as the result of head trauma. At the PCRA hearing, the defendant
presented the testimony of a forensic psychologist that the defendant suffered from
attention deficient hyper-active disorder ("ADHD") and that the pre-sentence report
and mental health evaluation suggested that the defendant "likely suffered from
cognitive and psychological problems."60 The Commonwealth's expert testified that
there was no evidence upon which to conclude that the defendant had ADHD. The
PCRA court concluded counsel was not ineffective for not investigating whether the
defendant suffered from any mental disease or defect. The court found that counsel
had no obligation to conduct such an investigation where she saw nothing in the
pre-sentence mental health evaluation to alert her to such problems and the defen-
dant did not tell her he had mental health problems. In affirming the denial of
relief, the Supreme Court noted the fact that the defendant had been convicted of
55. Direct appeal in Ly occurred prior to the Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002). Grant over-
ruled the long standing rule that claims of ineffectiveness were waived unless raised by new counsel at
the first opportunity, even if that first opportunity was direct appeal.
56. In cases where direct appeal was filed before Grant or where an appellate court has reviewed
claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness, in order to establish a PCRA claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness,
the defendant must plead and prove that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a claim of
ineffectiveness of prior counsel and present argument as to each prong of the Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786
A.2d 203,213 (Pa. 2001) standard as to appellate counsel's deficient performance. Commonwealth v. McGill,
832 A.2d 1014 (Pa. 2003).
57. For a view critical of the waiver rule in the context of extra-record claims on direct appeal, see Com-
monwealth v. Ly, 989 A.2d 2 (Pa.2010) (Saylor, J., dissenting from denial of Application for Reargument).
58. See Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717, 726-727 (Pa. 2000) ("reply brief ... is an inappropriate
means for presenting a new and substantively different issue than that addressed in the original brief").
59. 983 A.2d 666 (Pa. 2009).
60. Id. at 698.
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two murders in the present case and of a third murder in an unrelated case. In light
of his multiple murder convictions, the Court concluded that the defendant had
failed to establish that he had been prejudiced by counsel's failure to investigate
whether he suffered from any mental disease or defect. The Court held that the tes-
timony presented at the PCRA hearing"would not have led a rational jury to impose
a life sentence."61 The Court noted that the defendant's expert failed to find that the
defendant suffered from any serious mental health disease or defect and although
the expert believed the defendant suffered from ADHD, it was a "virtually a cer-
tainty"62 that no jury would have imposed a life sentence based upon this condition
in light of the defendant's multiple murders.6 3
Two additional capital cases involving claims that counsel was ineffective in fail-
ing to investigate and develop mitigation evidence were remanded by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court. In Commonwealth v. Beasley,M a case involving a second PCRA
petition filed prior to the 1996 amendments to the Act, the PCRA court concluded
trial counsel was not ineffective despite trial counsel's testimony that he had spent
little time preparing for the sentencing hearing6s and had not investigated defen-
dant's background including previous psychiatric hospitalizations. Remand was
required, the Court ruled, because the PCRA court failed to address most of the claims
asserted in the petition including counsel's failure to investigate mental health miti-
gation evidence. In addition to providing the PCRA court with a specific list of mat-
ters to be addressed on remand including a specific comparison of the mitigation
evidence offered at trial with the evidence presented in the post-conviction hearing,
the Court noted that the inadequate consideration by the PCRA court of the issues
raised by the defendant was not an "isolated incident". The Court reminded PCRA
courts of their obligation to prepare opinions based upon"governing law and rational
reasoning."
In Commonwealth v. Gibson,66 the Court remanded for a second time a post-con-
viction claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to develop mitigation evidence.
The PCRA court initially denied without an evidentiary hearing the defendant's
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitiga-
tion evidence finding instead that counsel had presented a strong case for mitigation
at the sentencing hearing. Following the initial remand, trial counsel testified that
because of his late retention in the case he did little or no investigation or prepara-
tion for the sentencing hearing. Appellate counsel testified that he conducted no
investigation of defendant's claim that trial counsel was ineffective at the sentenc-
ing hearing. While the PCRA court refused to allow testimony from mental health
experts, it concluded that the defendant was entitled to a new sentencing hearing
finding that the jury had not been presented with mitigation evidence that even a
minimal investi-gation would have uncovered. The Supreme Court concluded that
an additional remand was necessary with respect to the prejudice prong of the
ineffectiveness claim. The PCRA court was specifically instructed to resolve factual
61. Id. at 697.
62. Id.
63. See also Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d 1110, 1151 (Pa. 2008) (Castille, C.J., concurring) ("Where
the defendant is responsible for multiple murders . . ., he should have greater difficulty in securing
Strickland relief premised on foregone, supplemental mitigation evidence.").
64. 967 A.2d 376(Pa. 2009).
65. No mitigation evidence was presented by counsel at the penalty hearing. Instead, counsel offered
only the testimony of the defendant asking him to explain the circumstances of a prior murder and to say
anything he wished concerning his personality and character.
66. 951 A.2d 1110 (Pa. 2008).
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and credibility disputes and permit the development of mental-health mitigation
evidence. 67 In addition, the PCRA court was directed to develop a specific compar-
ison of the miti-gation case offered at trial with the evidence presented at the post-
conviction hearing and to explain why it is "reasonably probable that at least one
juror might have assigned weight" 68 to the post-conviction mitigation evidence
"equal to or greater than the substantial" 69 evidence of aggravation found by the
sentencing jury.
The issue of a defendant's right to waive presentation of mitigation evidence was
considered by the Court in Commonwealth v. Puksar7o and Commonwealth v. Tedford.71
In Puksar, the defendant claimed that counsel knew or had reason to know that he was
not competent to waive presentation of mitigating evidence in light of his history of
mental illness. At the PCRA hearing, one mental health expert testified that he did
not believe the defendant was competent to waive presentation of mitigating evi-
dence. Another expert testified that the defendant understood what was occurring
at the waiver of mitigation evidence colloquy but defendant's long standing mental
disorder prevented him from rationally participating in the penalty hearing. Trial
counsel testified that although he was aware of records of psychiatric and psycho-
logical evaluations, he never questioned defendant's competency to waive presen-
tation of mitigation evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief.
The Court held that the standard for waiving mitigation evidence is "whether the
defendant has the ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of under-
standing and whether the defendant has a rational understanding of the nature of
the proceedings."72 The Court concluded that under the standard, the defendant
had failed to establish that he lacked capacity to understand the proceedings and what
he was waiving. In addition, the Court gave weight to the PCRA court's and trial
counsel's contemporaneous observations of defendant's competency. The Court
also held that where a defendant repeatedly states that he does not want mitigating
evidence presented, counsel's failure to investigate potential mitigating evidence
prior to the defendant waiving the presentation of mitigating evidence does not
constitute ineffectiveness of counsel in the absence of evidence that the defendant
would not have waived presentation of mitigation evidence had counsel conducted
a mitigation investigation.73
In Tedford, the defendant argued that his waiver of his right to present mitigation
evidence was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because counsel failed to in-
form him that because the jury had already found that he killed the victim during a
rape, the death penalty would be automatic in the absence of mitigation evidence.
67. The Court noted that mental health mitigation evidence may play a more important role in a case
where alcohol and drug use is present as such use may be regarded by some jurors as having a "sub-
stantial volitional component." Commonwealth v. Gibson, 951 A.2d at 1123 fn. 11. For a different view of
mental health mitigation evidence, see concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Eakin, 951 A.2d at
1157.
68. Id. at 1123.
69. Id.
70. 951 A.2d 267 (Pa. 2008).
71. 960 A.2d 1 (Pa. 2008).
72. Puksar, 951 A.2d at 288.
73. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 475 (2007) where in the context of federal habeas review the
Court noted that where the defendant instructs counsel not to present mitigation evidence, counsel fail-
ure to "investigate further could not have been prejudicial under the Strickland standard. See also Common-
wealth v. Small, 980 A.2d 549 (Pa.2009) (where defendant during three colloquies stated his desire that
counsel not present mitigation evidence, direct appeal counsel not ineffective in failing to raise trial
counsel's failure to investigate and develop mitigation evidence).
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The defendant also claimed that his responses during the waiver colloquy74 indi-
cated that the he did not understand the sentencing proceeding. In affirming the
denial of PCRA relief, the Court concluded that the defendant's assumption that
counsel was obligated to inform him that failure to present mitigation evidence
would certainly lead to a sentence of death was incorrect. The Court noted that the
guilty verdict on the rape charge did not require the jury at the penalty hearing to
find that the victim's death occurred during the rape. In addition, the Common-
wealth was required to prove the specific aggravating circumstance unanimously
beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if proven, the Court noted the jury might have
ignored the law and returned a verdict of life. The Court also rejected the claim that
the defendant did not understand the sentencing proceeding by noting that the col-
loquy counsel conducted established that the defendant understood the nature of
the hearing and his right to present mitigation evidence.
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Appointment of Counsel
In a second or subsequent petition where an evidentiary hearing is granted and
the defendant is unable to obtain counsel, Pa.R.Crim.P.904(D) requires the court to
appoint counsel. Although the Rule appears to limit the appointment of counsel to
only the evidentiary hearing, in Commonwealth v. Jackson75 the Superior Court held
that Rule 904(F)(2) requires that appointment of counsel extends throughout the
appeal process and that this requirement applies to counsel appointed on a second
or subsequent petition.
Waiver of Counsel
When a defendant seeks self-representation in a PCRA hearing where counsel
has not withdrawn pursuant to Turner/Finley,76 the PCRA court is required to hold a
hearing77 for purposes of conducting an on-the-record waiver-of-counsel colloquy
governed by Pa.R.Crim.P. 121 (A)(2). 78 The colloquy requirement applies notwith-
standing the fact that the defendant has unequivocally indicated his desire to rep-
resent himself and has prepared an adequate petition or appellate brief.
Petition for Remand
When a defendant who is represented in an appeal from the denial of PCRA relief
files a pro se brief in the Superior Court alleging the ineffectiveness of appellate
counsel,79 counsel is required to petition the court for remand citing the allegations
74. The Court noted that at the time defendant's waiver occurred and the time of the Court's decision,
there is no required specific colloquy to "enure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently refused
to present mitigating evidence." Schnro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 479 (2007).
75. 965 A.2d 280 (Pa. Super. 2009).
76. Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super.
1998).
77. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455 (Pa. Super. 2009) (overruling Commonwealth v. Murray, 836
A.2d 956 (Pa. Super. 2003).
78. The Court noted that while subsections (b) and (c) of Pa R.Crim.P. 121 (A)(2) are not relevant to
PCRA proceedings, the remaining provisions of the Rule apply as to whether the defendant understands
the consequences of proceeding without counsel.
79. For a discussion of pro se filings while defendant is represented, see Commonwealth v. Ellis, 626 A.2d
1137, 1139 (Pa. 1993); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 645 A.2d 223, 224 (Pa. 1994); Commonwealth v. Purcell, 724
A.2d 293,302 (Pa. 1999).
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of ineffectiveness and providing the court with an evaluation of the claims.8 0 When
the defendant claims that counsel did not raise issues on appeal that were presented
in the PCRA petition, counsel is required to explain in the petition for remand the
nature and extent of his review of the claims not raised and include supporting cita-
tions for conclusions reached.8 1 Counsel may not rely upon the fact that the defen-
dant waived claims by not raising them in his pro se petition. Rather, counsel must
explain why the claims not raised in the pro se petition are without merit. 82
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 and Turner/Finley Letters
If the PCRA court intends to dismiss a PCRA petition on the basis that the claims
are frivolous, or that the alleged facts, if proven, would not entitle the defendant to
relief, or that there are no genuine issues of fact in dispute, Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1)
requires the court to give notice to the defendant of its intention to dismiss the
petition and the reasons for the dismissal. The Rule provides the defendant twenty
days to respond to the proposed dismissal. In Commonwealth v. Bond, 3 the Superior
Court held that notice of intention to dismiss was not required where counsel
informed the defendant on numerous occasions why he believed his claims were
meritless prior to seeking to withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley8 4 and the defendant
had an opportunity to respond to the motion to withdraw but did not. In Commonwealth
v. Hopfer,85 the PCRA court relied upon Bond when it granted counsel's petition to
withdraw and dismissed defendant's petition without giving the defendant notice
under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). In Hopfer, the Superior Court held that Bond did not apply
where the defendant did not have an adequate opportunity to respond to counsel's
motion to withdraw before the PCRA court dismissed the petition. The court held
that service of any type of notice of dismissal, whether a Pa.R.CrimP. 907(1) notice by
the PCRA court or a Turner/Finley no-merit letter86, must occur at least twenty days
before the petition is dismissed.
Duty to Pursue Timely Filed Petition
Section 9543(b) of the PCRA authorizes the dismissal of a petition where delay in
filing the petition results in prejudice to the Commonwealth. This section of the Act
appeared to be superceded when the Legislature amended the Act to require as a
general rule, that a petition must be filed within one-year of the date the judgment
becomes final.8 7 But in Commonwealth v. Renchenski,88 the Superior Court relied
upon §9543(b) in affirming the dismissal a petition that the court acknowledged had
been timely filed. In Renchenski, the PCRA court found that the defendant failed to
80. Commonwealth v. Battle, 879 A.2d. 266 (Pa. Super. 2005); Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 596 A.2d 165 (Pa.
1991).
81. Commonwealth v. Jette, 947 A.2d 202 (Pa. Super. 2008) (counsel must undertake a Finley-type analy-
sis of claims defendant wishes to raise upon filing petition for remand).
82. See also Commonwealth v. Warren, 979 A.2d 920 (Pa. Super. 2009) (counsel failed to detail the nature
and extent of his review of claims not raised on appeal).
83. 630 A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. 1993).
84. Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A 213 (Pa. Super. 1998).
85. 965 A.2d 270 (Pa. Super. 2009).
86. Withdrawal pursuant to Turner/Finley requires counsel to contemporaneously serve on the defen-
dant a copy of counsel's application to withdraw along with a copy of the no-merit letter and a statement
advising the defendant of his or her right to proceed pro se or with private counsel if the court grants the
application to withdraw. Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006).
87. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §9545(b).
88. 988 A.2d 699 (Pa. Super. 2010).
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take any action to advance the resolution of issues presented in his petition for more
than fourteen years after original counsel was permitted to withdraw. After new
counsel was finally appointed, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the petition on
grounds of prejudice alleging that its witnesses were no longer available if re-trial
was ordered. The Superior Court concluded that while §9543(b) refers to a "delay in
filing,"the dominant purpose of the section is to"ensure that the Commonwealth is
not prejudiced by defendant's delay in pursuing his post-conviction rights."89
Because defendant's failure to pursue his petition would result in prejudice to the
Commonwealth if it were required to retry the case, the court held that the PCRA
court did not err in dismissing the petition.
89. Id. at 703.
